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The major structural changes influencing world agricultural markets include increasing 
consolidation and market domination by large processing, trading, and retailing firms, 
disappearance of traditional auction or spot markets for exchange of farm products and their 
replacement by various forms of contracts and vertical control, and a growing emphasis on 
product differentiation and increasingly broad dimensions of product and selling-firm quality. 
None of these changes is consistent with the tenets of traditional models of competitive 
agricultural markets. 
Despite consolidation throughout the food market system, grocery retailers, oftentimes 
with international scope, have emerged as the dominant players in the food chain in most parts of 
the world. These retailers through marketing contracts exercise considerable vertical market 
control over upstream suppliers in terms of varieties produced, inputs utilized, production 
schedules, etc. Yet we know little about grocery retailer pricing and promotion strategies or how 
these strategies affect both the level and variability of prices at the farm level. This paper 
describes these key trends and their implications for farmer welfare and the analysis of 
agricultural markets. 
Key Forces Shaping World Agricultural Markets  
 
Rising Concentration and Consolidation Worldwide 
The food industry is highly concentrated in most developed countries at both the retail and 
processing stages, and concentration is rising over time (Sexton, 2000; Kaufman, 2000; Rogers, 
2001; Dobson, Waterson, and Davies, 2003). Mergers and acquisitions have been a major factor 
contributing to increasing concentration. However, ability to track these trends has been 
diminished by reduced data collection at national levels, so in many cases the most recent 
statistics are quite dated.  
Concentration in food retailing has risen rapidly in developing countries due to the 
supermarket revolution that began in the larger cities of richer Latin American countries and then 
quickly spread to smaller cities and poorer countries on the continent. By 2000, the supermarket 
share of retail sales in Latin America was in the range of 50-60%, only slightly less than the 70-
80% share attained in the United States over several decades. East and Southeast Asia 
experienced a similar diffusion, although beginning several years later than in Latin America. 
Africa is the most recent front in the global development of retail chains, with South Africa at the 
forefront, where Reardon et al. (2003) reported a 55% supermarket share of all retail food sales. 
Particularly noteworthy from the perspective of power in the global food market is that much of 
this growth has been accomplished by the large, international grocery chains, in particular, Wal-
Mart, Carrefour, and Royal Ahold, although smaller multinationals and regional chains have also 
played a key role (Reardon et al., 2003). 
Increasing Emphasis on Many Dimensions of Product and Firm Quality 
The term “quality” can refer to many dimensions of a food product including traditional 
attributes such as taste, appearance, convenience, brand appeal, and healthfulness, but also to 
broader dimensions such as characteristics of the production process—usage of chemicals,  
 
sustainability, physical location, or confinement conditions of animals—and implications of 
production and consumption of the product for the environment. 
Product quality in all of its dimensions is critical in modern food markets. Numerous 
studies have documented consumers’ willingness to pay premiums for food products that satisfy 
the quality dimensions that are important to them. Most of these studies are focused on 
developed-country consumers, but, given the emergence of high-value export chains in 
developing countries, the issues resonate there as well. Given the great heterogeneity among 
consumers in what food product attributes matter to them, considerable opportunities exist for 
product differentiation and exploitation of market niches. 
Of course, most firms do not sell directly to consumers, but instead sell to market 
intermediaries who transmit information regarding consumer demands upstream toward 
producers and also introduce additional considerations relating to their own preferences. As 
downstream buyers, especially retailers, have become increasingly powerful, transactions in the 
food sector have become more complex, involving more than the mere transfer of a food 
product. Thus, a second dimension of “quality” pertaining to the attributes of the firm producing 
and/or marketing the product has come to matter in modern, vertically coordinated market chains 
in terms of the firm’s abilities to satisfy the characteristics in a supplier sought by downstream 
buyers. These include ability to provide product reliably year around and in volumes necessary 
to meet demand; provide ancillary services, such as category management, third-party product-
safety certification, and electronic data interchange; and supply products across a category of 
food items. 
The ability to meet many of the characteristics sought by grocery retailers relates at least 
indirectly to size or scale of the seller, a fact which helps to explain the steady trend towards  
 
increasing firm size and concentration in the food marketing sector.  However, when the desired 
quality characteristics of the food products themselves are considered, opportunities are created 
for well-positioned, small firms to exploit market niches. 
Vertical Coordination and Control 
Vertical coordination and control and the use of production and marketing contracts is difficult to 
measure in a quantitative way because the extent of vertical relationships exists on a continuum, 
ranging from essentially none in open-market transactions to complete control in the case of 
vertical integration. Although contracts have been widely used in agriculture for a long time, 
their incidence is increasing and extending to the developing world and, further, the amount of 
control exercised is increasing, in large part due to the market’s increasing demand for 
multifaceted product quality.  
Contracts are a device to surmount the information problems that can lead to lower 
product quality. By actually controlling use of key inputs, including their application, 
downstream firms prevent problems from misalignment of incentives  that could otherwise 
diminish product quality and increase food safety issues. Contracts can also specify quality 
standards and thereby address adverse selection problems that might be caused by failure of the 
open market to adequately recognize and reward quality. 
Thus, there is little doubt that contract production can improve market efficiency and 
align production with the demands of the market for particular quality attributes. Contracts, 
however, may also be a device to consolidate buyer market power, and they may result in the 
exclusion of the smallest producers, leading to further consolidation at the farm sector. 
This latter issue is especially important in developing countries and is a topic of 
considerable debate and on-going research. Concomitant with the development of high-value  
 
export chains in these countries is the upsurge of contract production to insure the quality 
attributes desired by consumers in the European Union (EU) and United States. Is the growth of 
these markets providing opportunities to improve smallholder welfare, or does contract 
production and vertical integration by exporters cause the smallest and poorest farmers to be 
excluded? 
Grocery Retailer Power and Farmer Welfare 
High concentration among food retailers raises legitimate concerns about retailers’ ability 
to influence prices charged to consumers through exercise of oligopoly power by a few dominant 
sellers, and prices paid to suppliers through exertion of oligopsony power by a few dominant 
buyers. Consumers are distributed geographically and incur nontrivial transaction costs in 
traveling to and from stores. The relevant geographic markets for assessing retailer market power 
are local in scope, making grocery retailing a “natural oligopoly” in the words of Ellickson 
(2007). Further, as grocery stores become larger in both their physical dimensions and the 
number of products they carry, there will be fewer of them in a given geographical area, 
exacerbating the spatial oligopoly aspect. Retailer oligopoly power is also likely to be an 
important consideration in developing countries due to the generally poor transportation 
infrastructure, and, hence, high transportation costs, that exist in these locations.  
Of course, an argument can be made that consumers benefit on net from the food-
retailing revolution due to lower prices caused by economies of size and scope generated by 
large chains and by the access they offer to a vast array of products. The best empirical evidence 
on this point is several studies that show Wal-Mart sets prices lower than conventional retailers, 
and, moreover, induces a “yardstick of competition” effect by causing conventional 
supermarkets who compete in close proximity to Wal-Mart to charge lower prices.  
 
On the procurement side, large food manufacturers with prominent brands may be able to 
countervail retailer buying power, but grower-shippers when they sell directly to retailers and 
also private-label manufacturers lack similar bargaining power. The imbalance of bargaining 
power is exacerbated in industries where the farm product is highly perishable because grower-
shippers cannot access outside selling opportunities or defer sale through storage in hopes of 
attracting a better price. High transportation costs relative to product value for many 
commodities mean that procurement markets are local or regional in geographic scope, making 
market definition a critical component of any analysis of oligopsony power in food markets. 
What are the consequences of retailer market power for the welfare of farmers? A first 
basic point is that either oligopoly power or oligopsony power is detrimental to farmers because 
either causes diminished sales of the farm product, and, since farm price in all cases is 
determined at the intersection of total sales volume with the farm supply curve, any sales-
reducing market power reduces farm price along a normal upward-sloping supply curve. 
However, things are more complex than this simple analysis would suggest due to the 
ways in which modern retailers set their prices. I present three observations about grocery 
retailer pricing and the link between prices at farm and retail. Empirical support for these 
observations abounds, but is mainly based on analysis of retailing data for the United States and 
EU and is summarized in Sexton, Zhang and Chalfant (2003) and Li, Sexton, and Xia (2006). 
Jointly these factors cause the farm and retail prices nowadays to bear little relationship even for 
basic produce commodities, so a traditional model specifying retail price as a simple mark-up 
function of the farm price has almost no predictive power.  
·  Observation 1: Prices across retailers in a given city or region for a given commodity 
exhibit wide dispersion and low correlation.  
 
·  Observation 2: Retail price changes are at most loosely related to price changes for the 
farm commodity, and thus acquisition costs play a comparatively minor role in the retail 
pricing decision. 
·  Observation 3: Transmission of farm price changes to retail is (a) delayed, (b) 
incomplete, and (c) asymmetric. 
Table 1. Shipping-Point and Retail Price Correlations for California Hass Avocados—Los Angeles-Area Chains 
   LA-1-L  LA-1-S  LA-2-L  LA-2-S  LA-3-L  LA-3-S  LA-4-L  LA-5-L  LA-5-S 
LA1-L  1                  
LA1-S  0.53  1                
LA2-L  0.31  0.16  1              
LA2-S  0.09  0.11  0.19  1            
LA3-L  0.12  0.32  0.16  0.01  1          
LA3-S  -0.09  0.3  0.04  0.35  0.33  1        
LA4-L  -0.2  0.32  0.43  0.09  0.17  -0.05  1      
LA5-L  0.51  0.55  0.31  0.24  0.22  0.38  0.34  1    
LA5-S  0.31  -0.15  0.23  0.02  0.08  -0.26  0.25  0.04  1 
Shipping-L  0.13  0.27  0.13  0.34  0.14  0.13  0.36  0.35  0.32 
Shipping-L-1  0.16  0.29  0.15  0.33  0.17  0.15  0.34  0.35  0.31 
Shipping-S  0.28  0.35  0.26  0.45  0.1  0.16  0.4  0.43  0.35 
Shipping-S-1  0.28  0.38  0.27  0.48  0.12  0.18  0.34  0.44  0.33 
Notes: LAi-L (LAi-S) denotes large (small) avocados sold at retail chain i (i = 1,…,5) in Los Angeles; shipping-L and 
shipping-L-1 denote contemporaneous and one-week lagged shipping-point prices for large avocados shipped to Los 
Angeles, respectively. 
 
An illustration of observations 1 and 2 is provided in table 1 for Los Angeles area grocery 
chains for Hass avocados. The example is chosen because the Hass avocado is a primary 
agricultural product that is produced in close proximity to Los Angeles and undergoes little 
“processing” in moving from farm to retail, meaning that factors intervening between the farm 
and retail price are relatively limited. Yet we see that the correlations of prices among the Los 
Angeles retailers are very low and in some cases negative, as are the correlations between the 
shipping-point price for Los Angeles area shipments and the various retail prices.  
 
A model of competitive food retailers and simple, cost-based margins cannot explain any 
of these outcomes. Under perfect competition product prices for stores within a city should be 
highly correlated with each other and also with the price for the farm commodity. Under 
competitive retailing, price changes at the farm transmit fully and quickly, based upon shipping 
time, to retail. 
However, these observations are also mostly inconsistent with traditional models of 
market power and single-product sellers. Without question a key but little understood factor in 
grocery retailer pricing and marketing strategies is the multiproduct nature of food retailing. 
Modern U.S. supermarkets supply 40,000 or more distinct product codes and use a variety of 
strategies to differentiate themselves from their competitors.  
Models of unilateral seller market power can explain retail prices that respond only 
partially, or in extreme cases not at all, to changes in price at the farm level. Partial absorption of 
a farm price increase can represent the outcome of balancing the marginal impact of a lower 
profit per unit from not fully transmitting the cost shock with lower profit from reduced sales if 
the cost shock is transmitted fully.  
Price rigidity can also be explained by repricing or menu costs within a competitive 
market framework, or by some retailers’ use of everyday-low-pricing as an overarching 
marketing strategy in a differentiated oligopoly framework. However, menu and other costs 
associated with adjusting prices should cause prices to not change at all in response to minor 
shocks and to adjust fully to major shocks. The empirical evidence showing partial adjustment to 
shocks in the farm price is consistent with a market-power model, but not an adjustment-cost 
model. 
How Does Retailers’ Pricing Behavior Affect the Farm Product Market?  
 
Retailer market power, by reducing purchases and sales, causes lower prices at the farm gate. 
However, retail prices that adjust only partially, or not at all, to shocks in the farm market are 
also harmful to farmers, tending to reduce average farm income and increase its variability. The 
fundamental point is that, if some share of the final sellers of a commodity stabilize price relative 
to market conditions and thus only partially transmit farm price changes or pursue pricing 
policies unrelated to market conditions at the farm level, then final price must fluctuate more 
widely for all other sellers, in order for the market to clear. Marginal revenues are, thus, not 
equated across the alternative outlets selling the farm product, decreasing total revenue available 
from a given level of production. In addition to the potential farm income loss, retailers’ pricing 
strategies increase the volatility and riskiness of farm income compared to the baseline mark-up 
pricing case, further reducing the welfare of risk-averse farmers. 
Implications for Agricultural Market Analysis 
Are our traditional competitive models of agricultural markets capable of usefully analyzing 
modern markets and the forces discussed in this paper? The conclusion based upon my work in 
recent years, conducted jointly with various colleagues and current and former students, is that 
for many important questions even modest departures from perfect competition, such as the 
presence of relatively weak oligopoly or oligopsony power, are sufficient to lead analysis based 
upon the competitive model to severely biased conclusions.  
Some summary observations are as follows: 
·  Efficiency losses from modest departures from competition in the food-marketing sector 
are minor (Sexton, 2000). This point is well known, and can be seen intuitively by 
visualizing the basic deadweight loss triangle—the economic loss from failure to produce  
 
and consume the economically efficient amount. For a small departure from competition, 
this triangle is small—in the limit infinitesimally small. 
·  The deadweight loss increases at an increasing rate, so if market power is severe or is 
exercised at multiple stages along the market chain (Sexton et al. 2007), deadweight 
losses become large and consequential, approaching upwards of 25% of the total market 
surplus—benefit from consuming the product over and above the costs of producing it—
that would be available under perfect competition.  
·  The efficiency consequences of oligopoly power are relatively greater than the 
consequences of oligopsony power for a given level of market power, other factors 
constant. Oligopsony power matters to market efficiency only to the extent that the farm 
input matters as a factor in producing the final product. In the United States for example, 
the aggregate farm share as a fraction of the food retail dollar is now less than 20%, 
making oligopsony power quite inconsequential as a source of overall economic 
inefficiency. 
·  The distributional consequences of market power are much greater than the pure 
efficiency consequences. The profits earned by the marketing sector represent a rectangle 
with height equal to the retail price minus farm price and marketing costs and width equal 
to the market output. Any market power that causes output to decrease even slightly 
raises price to consumers and reduces price to farmers, expanding the height of the entire 
rectangle and generating concomitant reductions in consumer and producer surplus.  This 
point is of considerable importance because much of our market analysis is policy 
oriented, with specific policies designed to help farmers and oftentimes also poor 
consumers.  
 
·  Market intermediaries with even rather modest amounts of market power can capture 
large shares of the benefits from policies intended to benefit farmers. Sexton et al. (2007) 
demonstrate this point for tariff reductions by developed countries, considered a key 
strategy to improve developing country welfare. Downstream entities with market power, 
such as trading companies and retailers, were shown to capture the lion’s share of the 
benefits from tariff reduction, especially when both oligopoly and oligopsony power were 
exercised or if market power were exercised at successive stages in the market chain. 
·  Farmer investment decisions are distorted by the presence of market power.  Production 
decisions are of course distorted by market power, but this distortion will be small for 
modest levels of market power.  However, it is the much larger distributional 
consequences of market power that influence incentives to invest because downstream 
market intermediaries with market power will capture a large share of the benefits of such 
investments.  
·  Accepted “wisdom” regarding agricultural policies based upon analysis of competitive 
markets may not be true for imperfectly competitive markets. One example is the 
commonly perceived pro-development impacts of trade liberalization already discussed. 
Another regards decoupled agricultural income support programs, which need not 
improve welfare relative to price floor or deficiency payment programs when 
downstream markets are imperfectly competitive (Russo, 2008). By fixing a minimum 
farm price outside of the market process these policies restrict downstream buyers’ ability 
to exert oligopsony power. Thus, coupled support policies can, depending upon where 
minimum support prices are set, have a precompetitive and welfare-enhancing effect that 
is usually not considered when evaluating alternative policies.  
 
The Bottom Line 
Agricultural markets throughout the world have undergone a rather dramatic transformation 
marked by consolidation and market domination by large processing, trading, and retailing firms, 
disappearance of traditional auction or spot markets for exchange of farm products and their 
replacement by various forms of contracts and vertical control, and a growing emphasis on 
product differentiation and increasingly broad dimensions of product and firm quality.  
Large international grocery retail chains have emerged through this process as the 
dominant players in the food system. Despite their unquestionably important role in the food 
system, we know rather little about retailers’ behavior in terms of choices of products and brands 
carried, pricing strategies, and strategies concerning sales and promotions. Although consumers 
likely have benefitted from cost-reducing efficiencies introduced into the market chain and the 
entry of discount retailers, the impact on producers, especially small-scale producers, is probably 
less favorable. There is little evidence that the efficiencies generated by streamlining and 
coordinating food marketing through vertical control have contributed to higher prices at the 
farm level, as would be predicted in a competitive model of a vertical market chain. 
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